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Abstract
The most prominent way to establish trust between buyers
and sellers on online auction sites are reputation mechanisms.
Two drawbacks of this approach are the reliance on the seller
being long-lived and the susceptibility to whitewashing. In
this paper, we introduce so-called escrow mechanisms that
avoid these problems by installing a trusted intermediary
which forwards the payment to the seller only if the buyer
acknowledges that the good arrived in the promised condi-
tion. We address the incentive issues that arise and design an
escrow mechanism that is incentive compatible, efﬁcient, in-
terim individually rational and ex ante budget-balanced. In
contrast to previous work on trust and reputation, our ap-
proach does not rely on knowing the sellers’ cost functions
or the distribution of buyer valuations.
Introduction
Trading goods online has numerous advantages. One that is
particularly compelling is that online merchants can offer
their goods at lower prices compared to their ofﬂine coun-
terparts as the costs for running a physical store are higher.
This physical distance between buyer and seller, however,
also leads to trust problems. Consider the online auction site
eBay as an example: its procedure is such that the winning
bidder(henceforth:buyer)ﬁrstpaysforthegoodandthatthe
seller is required to send the good only after receipt of this
payment. Without any trust-enabling mechanisms in place,
the seller is best off keeping the good for himself, whether or
not he received the payment. Since a rational, self-interested
buyer can anticipate this, she will not send payment and no
trade takes place.1
Online marketplaces such as eBay address this trust prob-
lem with a reputation mechanism that publishes buyer feed-
back about a seller’s past behavior. From a game-theoretic
point of view this is justiﬁed by the seminal work on rep-
utation building by Fudenberg and Levine (1989). They as-
sume a long-lived player (seller) facing a sequence of short-
lived players (buyers). In each transaction, the buyer decides
whether or not to send payment followed by the decision
of the seller whether or not to send the good, where future
potential buyers observe the seller’s actions. Fudenberg and
Copyright c  2011, Association for the Advancement of Artiﬁcial
Intelligence (www.aaai.org). All rights reserved.
1We refer to buyers and sellers as female and male, respectively.
Levine show that reputation effects can lead to sellers and
buyers eventually cooperating such that all beneﬁcial trans-
actions take place. These positive results critically rely on
three assumptions: ﬁrst, the seller’s actions are publicly ob-
served by all following buyers; second, the seller is long-
lived, i.e. he will continue to trade on the marketplace indef-
initely; and, third, the seller cannot whitewash, i.e. create a
new reputation proﬁle once an old one is ran down.
However, these assumptions are rarely met in real-world
reputation mechanisms. Buyers’ experiences are not public
on eBay. Rather, the reputation mechanism relies on buyer
feedback. When feedback is published, there are ample rea-
sons for manipulation as, for example, a competitor degrad-
ingaseller’sreputationproﬁletopushhimoutofthemarket,
or a buyer who wants to lower prices for future purchases.
Furthermore, in settings with bidirectional feedback, retal-
iation can be a serious problem (e.g., Bolton, Greiner, and
Ockenfels, 2011). It is also not true that all sellers are in
the market long enough to be incentivized by future returns
that are dependent on today’s feedback. Moreover, it is very
easy to create a new identity and whitewash. It is thus not
surprising that eBay looks for alternative ways to establish
trust in their market as witnessed by their introduction of the
“eBay Buyer Protection” in September 2010. eBay makes
a decision about a claim based, in part, on the buyer’s and
seller’s transaction histories. Unfortunately, they introduce a
new problem: now buyers sometimes have an incentive to
falsely report that they didn’t receive the good.
In this paper, we introduce escrow mechanisms, in which
a trusted intermediary ﬁrst receives payment from a buyer,
and then forwards the payment to the seller only if the buyer
acknowledges that the good arrived in the promised condi-
tion. In the particular solution we present, buyers sometimes
receive a monetary rebate. It is important not to think about
this rebate as a reimbursement. Instead, the escrow mecha-
nism is designed to reward buyers for leaving truthful feed-
back about seller behavior. This in turn incentivizes sellers
to cooperate, since otherwise they do not receive their pay-
ments, and promotes efﬁciency while ensuring budget bal-
ance. Furthermore, we achieve incentive compatibility with-
out any common knowledge assumptions that we consider
problematic in applications. Moreover, escrow mechanisms
are “history-free,” i.e. they do not rely on the publication
of reported feedback. This improves on the state-of-the-artBuyer
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denote the buyer’s and the seller’s payoff, respectively.
in that it avoids the assumption of long-lived sellers and re-
moves the whitewashing problem. While we illustrate the
application of escrow mechanisms to online auction sites
like eBay, the general technique applies to a wide range of
online markets.
A related line of research has developed on truthful
feedback for reputation mechanisms. The peer prediction
method by Miller, Resnick and Zeckhauser (2005) and its
extensions due to Jurca and Faltings (2006; 2009) elicit
truthful feedback for opinion forums. In earlier work, we
study its application to an online auction setting with a
strategic seller (Witkowski 2010). Jurca and Faltings (2007)
study a similar problem, but their solution relies on repeated
interactions between the buyer and the seller, which makes
it inapplicable to e-commerce platforms like eBay or Ama-
zon marketplace where most buyers interact with a partic-
ular seller only once. Furthermore, all these mechanisms
still rely on publishing reported feedback. Our mechanism is
most closely related to that of Dellarocas (2003), who stud-
ies online markets and incentivizes truthful seller behavior
via listing fees. However, in contrast to our solution, Del-
larocas’ approach relies on knowing the seller’s cost func-
tion and the distribution of buyer valuations. Moreover, our
mechanism does not distort the sellers’ surplus and—in the
presence of fraudulent sellers—it remains both efﬁcient and
budget-balanced.
The Setting
Consider for concreteness an online auction site like eBay
where transactions proceed as follows: a seller in auction i
posts a description of the good that he wants to sell and sets
a reserve price mi  0. People interested in the good bid
for it in a second-price auction, where the bidder with the
highest bid wins and has to pay the amount corresponding
to the second highest bid or the reserve price, whichever is
higher.2 If the seller’s reserve price is higher than the highest
2Please note that it is straightforward to generalize escrow
mechanisms to other auction designs.
bid, the good is not sold and the game ends. We refer to the
price of the ith auction as pi. We assume that bids are natural
numbers such as cent values.
Consider Figure 1, which depicts the game tree for a sin-
gle trade, assuming the good was sold and the winner of
the auction has been determined. First, the buyer is asked
to transfer the money to the seller and the game ends here
with 0 payoff for both parties if the buyer does not pay. If
the buyer pays, the seller decides whether to send the good
or keep it. That is, a seller can play either high or low effort.
The seller’s effort with respect to the buyer of auction i is
denoted by ei 2 fL;Hg. Exerting low effort corresponds to
doing nothing and is free. High effort, however, is costly to
the seller. The associated cost is denoted by ci and is private
to the seller. We also overload the notation and use ci(L)
and ci(H) where more convenient to denote the seller’s cost
when exerting low or high effort respectively.
Following seller effort, buyer i observes a signal si that
takes one of two possible values, “low” or “high”: si 2
S = fl;hg. In the context of online auctions, for exam-
ple, a high signal refers to “buyer received item in described
quality;” a low signal refers to “item signiﬁcantly not as de-
scribed, or item not received.” Signals depend stochastically
on the seller’s effort and the probability for signal instantia-
tion sm 2 fl;hg given that the seller played ek 2 fL;Hg is
denoted by: f(smjek) = Pr(si = smjei = ek). Note that
f(smjek) is assumed to be the same for all of the seller’s
auctions and is private information to the seller. Low ef-
fort leads to a low signal with certainty, i.e. f(ljL) = 1,
while the probability of a high signal following high effort
is positive but the outcome may also be a low signal, that is
1 > f(hjH) > 0. For example, the seller might send the
good as described but it gets lost in the mail.
Buyer i’s valuation for signal sm is denoted by vi(sm),
where we simplify notation, such that vi = vi(h) is her
valuation for the good as described. A buyer’s valuation
for a low signal is 0, i.e. vi(l) = 0, but the value for vi
is private knowledge of the buyer. We assume that both
buyers and sellers are risk-neutral. Moreover, we assume
they have quasi-linear utility functions, i.e. ui(vi;pi;si =
sm) = vi(sm)   pi for the buyers and us(ci;pi;ei = ek) =
pi   ci(ek) for the sellers.
To clarify the trust problem, let us apply backward induc-
tion to this game. The last action is the effort decision by the
seller. If he exerts high effort, i.e. if he sends the good in the
described quality, he receives a payoff that is ci less than if
he keeps it which means that he should choose L. Anticipat-
ing this, however, the buyer should not pay since receiving a
payoff of 0 is better than paying pi and getting nothing. This
is the problem of moral hazard (e.g., Dellarocas, 2006).
The Basic Mechanism
The escrow procedure only comes into play if a good is sold
and a buyer has been determined. The core concept of an
escrow mechanism is that a buyer does not pay the seller di-
rectly but via a trusted third party (henceforth the center).
First, the buyer sends her payment to the center which holds
it in escrow. The center then acknowledges receipt of pay-
menttotheseller,whothendecideswhethertoexerteffortornot. Once the seller has exerted his effort, the buyer is asked
by the center what signal she received. Only if the buyer re-
ports a high signal does the center forward the buyer’s pay-
ment to the seller.
In contrast to presently-used escrow procedures, we do
not simply reimburse every buyer who reports a low signal,
because that creates a strong incentive for buyers to always
report low. Thus, the key question is how to proceed with
the withheld payment following a low report. While the es-
crow procedure only comes into play if an auction clears,
the way the withheld payments are handled affects the bid-
ding behavior in the auction preceding the escrow proce-
dure. Thereby, the design of the escrow procedure also af-
fects the efﬁciency of the overall mechanism.
Consider a straw-man solution to this problem: we could
use the reports solely to determine the seller’s payment and
leave the surplus that it generates with the center. However,
this mechanism is not efﬁcient. The intuition is that buyers
will take into account f(ljH), i.e. the chance of receiving
a low signal. Consequently, they lower their bids which can
cause efﬁcient trade to fail. If the center knew f(ljH), then
one way to achieve efﬁciency would be to pay a ﬁxed re-
bate to every buyer, namely f(ljH)pi, to offset the buyer’s
expected losses per transaction. The escrow mechanism that
we present in this section is always efﬁcient without relying
on the center knowing f(ljH).
The main idea of our mechanism is that whether or not a
buyer receives a rebate (equal to her escrow payment) de-
pends on the report of another buyer. Essentially, by the
buyer reporting a signal, she enters into a lottery for re-
ceiving a rebate back from the escrow mechanism.3 Nothing
changes for the seller. It remains the case that the center for-
wards the payment to the seller if and only if the respective
buyer reports a high signal.
Here, we present the mechanism with one seller and two
buyers. We use indices 1 and 2 to refer to the corresponding
auctions, their buyers, and the reports of those buyers. More
generally, we use indices i and 3   i (observe that if i = 1,
it holds that 3   i = 2 and vice versa). We need at least two
buyers to be able to determine each buyer’s rebate payment.
Every buyer needs to transfer the escrow payment pi, i.e. the
price of the good, to the center. If she reports a signal then
she also has a chance to receive her payment back. We de-
note buyer i’s signal report in auction i by ri 2 S = fl;hg.
Figure 2 depicts how the mechanism groups a seller with
two randomly chosen buyers. The critical parts are Steps 8
and 9: if a buyer reports h, the center pays the seller and the
other buyer receives nothing back. If a buyer reports l, her
payment is not forwarded to the seller, and the second buyer
receives back her own original payment. We overload the
notation for the price, such that pi(ri) denotes the net pay-
ment to the seller following report ri with pi(h) = pi and
pi(l) = 0. Note that the seller learns about both reports only
in Step 7. Similarly, each buyer only knows her own signal
observation at the time of reporting.
3It is straightforward to use the reports of more than one other
buyer to determine a buyer’s rebate, so that the expected rebate
stays the same but its variance is lower.
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Figure 2: Procedure of the escrow procedure of the basic
mechanism once the prices have been determined.
The seller’s utility for participating in the mechanism con-
sists of the negative costs for exerting effort plus the report-
dependent payments he receives:
u
s(e
i;e
3 i;r
i;r
3 i) =  c
i(e
i)   c
3 i(e
3 i) + p
i(r
i) + p
3 i(r
3 i):
In practice, buyers may have a small cost for reporting feed-
back but, for reasons of clarity, we assume that their report-
ing costs are zero. Note, however, that a buyer only has the
chance to receive her good for free when reporting a sig-
nal. A buyer’s utility when participating both in the auction
and the reporting phases depends on her valuation for the
observed signal and on her net payment:
u
i(s
i;r
i;r
3 i) = v
i(s
i)   p
i(r
3 i):
Theoretical Analysis
In this section, we show that the basic escrow mechanism is
incentive compatible, efﬁcient, interim individually rational
and ex ante budget-balanced. For the proofs we require the
following lemma.
Lemma 1. Given that the seller in auction i plays ei =
H, it is a weakly dominant strategy for bidders to bid their
valuations.
Proof. Let v denote a generic bidder’s value, and pi denote
the price that the winning bidder has to pay in auction i.
The bidder who wins auction i has an expected valuation of
f(hjH)v+f(ljH)pi, where the ﬁrst term is the probabil-
ity of receiving a high signal times the bidder’s valuation for
the item, and the second term corresponds to the expected
rebate, i.e. the probability of receiving a low signal times the
price she had to pay. Thus, her expected utility upon winning
is f(hjH)  v + f(ljH)  pi   pi = f(hjH) 
 
vi   pi
. So,
wheneverhervaluationisatleastashighastheprice,sheob-
tains positive utility and wants to win the auction. Since this
is just the standard second-price auction case, it is a weakly
dominant strategy for the bidder to bid her valuation.Incentive Compatibility
The information about the state of the game does not change
between the seller’s ﬁrst and second effort decision, and so it
is strategically equivalent to combine these two actions into
a single one. We adopt this viewpoint in the sequel.
Deﬁnition 1 (Subgame-Perfect Incentive Compatibility).
An escrow mechanism is subgame-perfect incentive com-
patible if the following strategy proﬁle is a subgame perfect
equilibrium4:
 Seller: Plays e1 = e2 = H.
 Buyers: Bid their valuations v1;v2 in the auction and re-
port their true signals r1 = s1;r2 = s2.
To prove that the basic escrow mechanism is incentive com-
patible, we ﬁrst prove the following lemma.
Lemma 2. Given an honest buyer report, setting the reserve
price in auction i to mi = b c
i
f(hjH) + 1c weakly dominates
for the seller any strategy where mi  c
i
f(hjH).
Proof. Let b1 and b2 be the highest and the second highest
bid in the auction phase. We simplify notation by setting
Ci = c
i
f(hjH) and we distinguish two cases:
1. b1 < bCi + 1c. For mi = bCi + 1c, the seller obtains
utility 0 as the good is not sold. For any lower value of mi,
he also receives 0 utility: the good is either not sold or it sold
for pi  bCic in which case the seller is either indifferent
between H and L or plays L.
2. b1  bCi + 1c. For mi = bCi + 1c, the seller’s payoff
depends on b2: if b2  bCi + 1c, the price equals b2 and
his expected utility is b2   Ci. If b2  bCic, the price is
pi = bCi+1c which results in a seller utility of pi Ci > 0
after playing H. For mi  bCic, the seller’s payoff also
depends on b2: if b2  bCic, his expected utility is b2   Ci.
If b2  bCi   1c, the price is pi = bCic which results in
seller utility of 0 independent of what he is playing.
Next, we show that our mechanism is weakly incentive
compatible. The weak notion of incentive compatibility re-
sults from the buyers being only indifferent between report-
inghonestlyandlying.Despitethisindifference,thefactthat
we do not use a history of published feedback ensures ro-
bustness to certain manipulations that are common in repu-
tation systems (e.g., badmouthing competitors). Later in the
paper we present a mechanism that provides strict incentives
to report truthful signals.
Theorem 3. The basic escrow mechanism is (weakly)
subgame-perfect incentive compatible.
Proof. By backward induction. Since buyer i’s report ri
does not inﬂuence her rebate, she is indifferent between re-
porting honestly and lying. Thus, in the reporting phase, nei-
ther buyer has an incentive to deviate from honest reporting.
As the seller’s decision does not depend on any other player
(given the honest buyers), he can look at his effort decision
for each buyer separately. His expected utility for exerting
high effort for buyer i is  ci + f(hjH)  pi. His expected
4For a deﬁnition, see p. 74 in Fudenberg and Tirole (1991)
utility for exerting low effort is 0, so that his single best re-
sponse is to play H if pi > c
i
f(hjH) for i = 1;2. This con-
dition holds as it follows from Lemma 2 that the seller sets
a reserve price mi > c
i
f(hjH). Thus, the seller has an incen-
tive to play e1 = e2 = H and the resulting situation is the
standard one-shot second-price auction with reserve price.
Incentive compatibility follows from Lemma 1.
Efﬁciency
Let V i denote the highest valuation of all bidders involved
in auction i. Because the winning bidder only receives her
value V i with probability f(hjH), her expected valuation
for winning is f(hjH)  V i.
Deﬁnition 2 (Efﬁciency). A mechanism is efﬁcient if, for ev-
ery auction i, the good is sold to the bidder with the highest
value V i whenever
f(hjH)  V i  ci (1)
and remains with the seller otherwise.
We study efﬁciency for a reserve price mi = c
i
f(hjH)+ with
 ! 0.
Proposition 4. The basic escrow mechanism is efﬁcient.
Proof. “)” If the good is sold, we know that the price is
at least as high as the reserve price, i.e. pi  mi = c
i
f(hjH).
AccordingtoLemma1,potentialbuyersbidtheirvaluations,
so that vi  pi and, taken together, we obtain vi  c
i
f(hjH)
which satisﬁes the property in Deﬁnition 2.
“(” Whenever f(hjH)  V i  ci, we know that V i = vi
and thus vi  c
i
f(hjH). Thus, the highest bidder’s bid is larger
or equal to the seller’s reserve price mi = c
i
f(hjH), and the
good is sold.
Individual Rationality
A common problem of online reputation mechanisms, in-
cluding the one employed by eBay, is that a buyer’s realized
utility can still be negative, for example when the good never
arrives and there is no way to get a full refund. While this
also applies to our mechanism, we nevertheless establish a
formal result on participation.
Deﬁnition 3 (Interim IR). A mechanism is interim individ-
ually rational if the following holds true in equilibrium:
1. Knowing his costs, every seller has a non-negative
expected utility when participating in the market:
Us(ei;e3 i;ri;r3 ijci)  0.
2. Knowing her valuation for the good, each buyer has a
non-negative expected utility when participating in the
market: Ui(si;ri;r3 ijvi)  0.
Proposition 5. The basic escrow mechanism is interim IR.
Proof. According to Lemma 2, the seller sets his reserve
prices mi strictly larger than c
i
f(hjH) and thus he is guar-
anteed non-negative utility. Next, without loss of generality,
consider the ﬁrst buyer’s expected utility after the price hasbeen set but before she learns her signal: U1(r1;r2jv1) =
E

v1
  E

p1  
r2
= f(hjH)
 
v1   p1
. This is non-
negative.
Budget Balance
AscanbeseenbyinspectingFigure2,the mechanism’s bud-
get for auctions 1 and 2 is B = p1(r2) p1(r1)+p2(r1) 
p2(r2).
Deﬁnition 4 (Budget Balance). Assuming the seller and
the buyers play the equilibrium strategies deﬁned in Deﬁ-
nition 1, an escrow mechanism is ex ante budget-balanced if
the expected budget equals zero, i.e. E[B] = 0. An escrow
mechanism is ex post budget-balanced if for every equilib-
rium outcome the realized budget equals zero, i.e. B = 0.
Proposition 6. The basic escrow mechanism is ex ante
budget-balanced.
Proof. In equilibrium, the expected budget is:
E [B] = E

p
1(r
2)   p
1(r
1) + p
2(r
1)   p
2(r
2)

= E

p
1(r
2)

  E

p
1(r
1)

+ E

p
2(r
1)

  E

p
2(r
2)

= f(hjH)  p
1 f(hjH)  p
1 + f(hjH)  p
2 f(hjH)  p
2
= f(hjH)
 
p
1   p
1 + p
2   p
2
= 0
The third line follows from the second since the conditional
signal probability f(hjH) is the same for both buyers and in
equilibrium, the buyers report their true signals.
Observe that if p1 = p2, the realized budget is always zero.
However, if p1 6= p2 and it happens that the buyers receive
different signals due to random noise, then the realized bud-
get is not balanced. Thus, the basic escrow mechanism is
not ex post budget-balanced. Note that in large markets like
eBay, ex ante budget balance is already a satisfying concept
since there, the center’s long-term risk is minimal. Further-
more, by matching auctions with similar prices, the center
can reduce the variance of its budget.
Strict Buyer Incentives
A drawback of the mechanism discussed so far is that a
buyer is only indifferent between honest reporting and lying.
In this section we show that if seller abilities vary and if the
center has distributional information about these variations,
we can design an incentive compatible escrow mechanism
with strict buyer incentives by adapting the peer prediction
method (Miller, Resnick, and Zeckhauser 2005). The gen-
eral idea of the peer prediction method is to compare the
reported signals of the two buyers and construct a payment
rule that depends on the comparison of these two reports.
Based on prior probability knowledge about the seller’s abil-
ities, the center can design payments such that buyers maxi-
mize their expected utility when reporting honestly.
Extended Setting with Type Uncertainty
For the peer prediction method to be applicable to settings
with moral hazard, it is crucial that there is seller type un-
certainty in equilibrium, such that a buyer observing a sig-
nal learns something about another buyer’s signal from the
same seller. We study a model where type uncertainty stems
from one seller being more accurate in describing the good
than another seller. Imagine, for example, a used laptop be-
ing sold on eBay. The same laptop would be described dif-
ferentlybytwodifferentsellers.Whileonesellerwouldstate
that it is “running perfectly”, another would describe the lap-
top’s condition more accurately. This difference in behavior
inﬂuences the signal distribution of these two sellers, in that
the latter has a higher probability to satisfy his customers
and thus a higher probability of inducing high signals. It is
important to note that neither seller intends to cheat, but that
they are of different nature.
Formally, each seller is of one of two types, namely
of the “good” or the “bad” type:  2  = fG;Bg.
All agents share a common prior belief Pr(G) that the
seller is of the good type G with 1 > Pr(G) > 0 and
Pr(G) + Pr(B) = 1. The signal of a buyer depends on
the seller’s type. The probability for signal sm given that the
seller played ek and is of type t is assumed to be common
knowledge and denoted by: ft(smjek) = Pr(si = smj =
t;ei = ek). The probability of a high signal following high
effort is larger for a seller of the good type than it is for
a seller of the bad type: fG(hjH) > fB(hjH). Low ef-
fort leads, independent of the seller’s type, to a low signal:
ft(ljL) = 1 for all t 2 .
Because of the type uncertainty and because buyers now
have beliefs over sellers’ types, we adopt perfect Bayesian
equilibrium for the analysis of the peer prediction escrow
mechanism.
Deﬁnition 5 (Perfect-Bayesian Incentive Compatibility).
An escrow mechanism is perfect-Bayesian incentive com-
patible if the following strategy proﬁle is a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium5:
 Seller: Plays e1 = e2 = H.
 Buyers: Bid their valuations v1;v2 in the auction and re-
port their true signals r1 = s1;r2 = s2.
The Peer Prediction Escrow Mechanism
As before, we overload the notation of pi and let pi(ri;r3 i)
denote buyer i’s net payment to the seller which now de-
pends on both ri and r3 i. The seller’s utility is deﬁned as
before, but the utility function of a buyer changes slightly:
u
i(s
i;r
i;r
3 i) = v
i(s
i)   p
i(r
i;r
3 i):
The escrow procedure still requires the buyer to transfer pi
to the center right after the auction clears. The probability
of buyer 3   i’s signal given buyer i’s signal is denoted by
gi(sjjsm) = Pr(s3 i = sjjsi = sm). For peer prediction
to work, one buyer’s signal must tell you something about
the probability of the other buyer’s signal. Formally, this
concept is called stochastic relevance (Miller, Resnick, and
Zeckhauser 2005). With only two signals h and l, this cor-
responds to the requirement that gi(hjh) 6= gi(hjl) which
follows from our setting if the seller plays e1 = e2 = H be-
causefG(hjH) > fB(hjH).WerefertothepaperbyMiller,
5For a deﬁnition, see p. 325 in Fudenberg and Tirole (1991)Resnick and Zeckhauser (2005) for the Bayesian transfor-
mations required to compute g(sjjsm). Note that the center
needstoperformadditionalBayesianupdatesincaseabuyer
buys multiple items from the same seller over time.
Our goal is to design a payment rule such that in equilib-
rium, buyer i’s expected utility when reporting honestly is
strictly higher than when lying. Thus, we analyze the situ-
ation where the seller and buyer 3   i play the equilibrium
strategies deﬁned in Deﬁnition 1 and construct net payments
pi(ri;r3 i) such that reporting honestly is buyer i’s unique
bestresponseinthereportingphase.Inequilibriumtheseller
plays e1 = e2 = H and thus the gi(sjjsm) are symmetric
with regard to the buyers and we can drop its superscript.
The expected utility of buyer i following signal sm is then:
U
i(r
ijs
i = sm) = v
i(sm)  
X
sj2S
g(sjjsm)  p
i(r
i;sj):
We now describe the construction of a linear program whose
solution is a payment rule pi(ri;r3 i) with the desired
properties, using the formulation due to Jurca and Falt-
ings (2006). The incentive compatibility constraints require
that the expected payment following an honest report is
lowerthanthatofadishonestreport.Thatis,forallsm; sd 2
S; sm 6= sd:
X
sj2S
g(sjjsm)  p
i(sm;sj) <
X
sj2S
g(sjjsm)  p
i(sd;sj)
To preserve budget balance and interim IR, a buyer must pay
the same in expectation as in the basic setting. Note that the
prior probability for a high signal report by the other buyer
was f(hjH) and is now Pr(s3 i = h):
X
sm2S
Pr(sm)
 X
sj2S
g(sjjsm)p
i(sm;sj)

= Pr(s
3 i = h)p
i
Finally, we demand that the best situation for a buyer is that
she has to pay nothing while the worst is that she receives
nothing back. That is, for every ri;r3 i 2 S, it holds that:
0  p
i(r
i;r
3 i)  p
i
Given these constraints, we maximize the rebate given to
buyers who had bad experiences, i.e. our objective function
maximizes
p
i  
X
sj2S
g(sjjl)  p
i(l;sj):
The payments pi(ri;r3 i) for buyer i can then be found as
the solution to the following linear program:
max. p
i  
X
sj2S
g(sjjl)  p
i(l;sj)
s.t.
X
sj2S
g(sjjsm)

p
i(sd;sj)   p
i(sm;sj)

 
for all sm; sd 2 S; sm 6= sd
X
sm2S
Pr(sm)
 X
sj2S
g(sjjsm) p
i(sm;sj)

= Pr(h)  p
i
0  p
i(sm;sj)  p
i for all sm;sj 2 S
Theorem 7. The peer prediction escrow mechanism is
(strictly) perfect-Bayesian incentive compatible, efﬁcient,
interim individually rational and ex ante budget-balanced.
Proof Sketch. When buyer i receives signal si, the expected
net payment E

pi(ri;r3 i)jsi
is strictly smaller when she
honestly reports ri = si than when she lies. After making
an honest report, a buyer’s expected rebate is equal to her
price times the probability of not receiving the good. Thus,
she will bid her valuation in the auction, and together with
reporting honestly in the reporting phase, this constitutes in-
centive compatibility of the mechanism. Efﬁciency, interim
individual rationality and ex ante budget balance follows di-
rectly from incentive compatibility and the proofs for these
properties proceed analogously to the proofs for Proposi-
tions 4 to 6.
Collusion and Cross-Seller Matching
One drawback of the escrow mechanisms discussed so far is
their susceptibility to collusion. There are two possible types
of collusion: ﬁrst, two buyers colluding with each other and,
second, theseller colludingwith one ofthe buyers. Through-
out, it is helpful to split the net payment pi(ri;r3 1) into
two parts: the escrow part and the peer prediction part. The
escrow part corresponds to the rebate paid out in the basic
escrow mechanism while the peer prediction part is the pay-
ment needed to guarantee strict incentives in the reporting
phase.
In the buyer-buyer collusion attack, two buyers agree to
buy from the same seller and both report a low signal, such
that both receive a rebate. This attack can involve multiple
collusioncostsC,whichmayincludeaccountcreationcosts,
bidding costs, and the costs for paying for an item obtained
in the auction. Note that we can set the peer prediction part
of the net payment arbitrarily small. To make honest report-
ing as attractive as possible, we set the peer prediction part
of the net payment such that the maximally attainable peer
prediction payment equals C   " for some small " > 0.
Then, a collusion attack on the peer prediction payments
is not beneﬁcial and, consequently, we only need to worry
about collusion attacks on the escrow part of the payment.
To obtain robustness to buyer-buyer collusion in regard to
the escrow part, we introduce “cross-seller matching.” Up to
this point, every buyer was “matched” with another buyer
from the same seller. With cross-seller matching, the escrow
mechanismisunchanged,exceptthateverybuyerismatched
with a buyer from a different seller, randomly chosen from
all auctions clearing within a particular time period, such as
a day. Thus, a buyer could now be matched with a buyer
from a seller of a different type to determine the escrow
part of the net payment. The peer prediction part of the net
payment, however, is still determined by the report from an-
other buyer from the same seller. Assuming that every buyer
only participates in one auction per time period, it is easy to
see that introducing cross-seller matching preserves the peer
prediction escrow mechanism’s properties. The intuition is
that a priori, i.e. before receiving a signal from the seller, the
buyer’s belief regarding her own seller’s type is equal to the
prior belief of any other seller’s type.Using cross-seller matching, we can make the peer pre-
diction escrow mechanism robust against buyer-buyer collu-
sion. For each time period, we let N denote the total number
of clearing auctions, and we assume that each buyer only
participates once. We obtain the following theorem:
Theorem 8. The peer prediction escrow mechanism with
cross-seller matching is robust against buyer-buyer collu-
sion attacks if C > 1
N 2  pi.
Proof Sketch. The intuition for collusion-robustness is that in
large enough markets, i.e. where N is large, the probability
of being matched with a colluder is very small, and thus,
the collusion costs C will be larger than the expected gains
from colluding. We leave the details of the proof to a longer
version of the paper.
Next, we consider the second collusion attack, i.e. a seller
colluding with one of his buyers. In this attack, the seller ex-
erts low effort which results in a low signal with certainty,
but the buyer reports a high signal. Thus, the payment from
thebuyerisforwardedtotheseller,sothatthecolludershave
neither lost nor gained money. Considering that there is also
a strictly positive chance of receiving the escrow payback,
this collusion attack is powerful: the attackers never lose
money and sometimes win money. Even with cross-seller
matching, the attackers gain Pr(si = l)  pi in expectation.
However, this attack can also involve many different collu-
sion costs C. These can include the costs for creating a buyer
and a seller account, the costs for listing the item as a seller,
thecostsforbiddingontheitemasabuyer,andﬁnally,what-
ever sales fee the market platform charges. Taking these col-
lusion costs into account, we obtain the following theorem:
Theorem 9. The peer prediction escrow mechanism with
cross-seller matching is robust against buyer-seller collu-
sion attacks if C > Pr(si = l)  pi.
Proof. In the buyer-seller collusion attack, buyer i’s pay-
ment is forwarded to the seller with certainty, no value is
gained or lost, and no money is gained or lost. Thus, we
only need to consider the rebate part. Because of cross-seller
matching, neither the buyer nor the seller can inﬂuence the
rebate, and the probability of receiving the rebate is equal
to Pr(si = l), i.e. the prior probability of a low signal.
Thus, the expected rebate is Pr(si = l)  pi. Consequently,
if C > Pr(si = l)  pi, the expected utility from the buyer-
seller collusion attacks is negative.
In real-world marketplaces, the biggest part of the collu-
sion cost for the buyer-seller collusion attack would most
likely be some kind of sales fee. Note that eBay, for exam-
ple, charges a ﬁnal value fee of 9% (capped at $100) for
all items sold via regular auctions. Thus, in this case, the
collusion costs are proportional to the selling price, namely
pi  fee. For the collusion attack to be unattractive, we thus
need that pi  fee > Pr(si = l)  pi which is true when-
ever fee > Pr(si = l). In practice, we would expect that
the probability of not receiving the good in the promised
condition is relatively low, most certainly smaller than 9%,
i.e., Pr(si = l) < 0:09. Thus, for markets with large sales
fees, cross-seller matching is effective to provide robustness
against buyer-seller collusion attacks.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have introduced escrow mechanisms to
address moral hazard in online markets. The main idea is
to install a trusted intermediary that forwards the payment
from the buyer to the seller only if the buyer reports that
she has received the good in the promised condition. A dis-
tinct property of escrow mechanisms is that they do not pub-
lish feedback reports and are thus history-free. In contrast
to reputation mechanisms, escrow mechanisms do not rely
on long-lived sellers and do not have a whitewashing prob-
lem. Furthermore, we have shown how they can be used to
properly incentivize sellers and buyers without any knowl-
edge of the buyers’ valuations or the sellers’ cost functions.
It was interesting to see that the rebate we pay back to the
buyers is necessary for the mechanisms to be fully efﬁcient.
Because we do not publish any feedback, there is no rep-
utation proﬁle that buyers can manipulate. This enabled us
to achieve strict incentives in the reporting phase with any
positive budget for the peer prediction part of the payment,
while maintaining ex ante budget balance. Combining this
with cross-seller matching, we were able to make the mech-
anism robust against collusion attacks.
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